Locating Traitorous Identities: Toward a View of Privilege-Cognizant White Character by Bailey, Alison
Illinois State University
ISU ReD: Research and eData
Faculty Publications - Philosophy Philosophy
8-1998
Locating Traitorous Identities: Toward a View of
Privilege-Cognizant White Character
Alison Bailey
Illinois State University, baileya@ilstu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/fpphil
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at ISU ReD: Research and eData. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications - Philosophy by an authorized administrator of ISU ReD: Research and eData. For more information, please contact ISUReD@ilstu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bailey, Alison, "Locating Traitorous Identities: Toward a View of Privilege-Cognizant White Character" (1998). Faculty Publications -
Philosophy. 5.
https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/fpphil/5
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334717
282 Decentering the Center
Bird, Elizabeth S., cd. 1996. Jhssinginfcathers:  The construction offrhc Jndiun in American
~~OJ~J&U ctkurc. I3oAlcr, CO: Wcstvicw Press.
Boyarin, Daniel, and Jonathan Boyarin. 1995. Diaspora: Generation and the ground of
Jewish identity. In Identities, ed. Kwame Anthony Appiah  and Henry Louis Gates.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Daly, Mary. 1978. GynlEcolqy:  The metaethics ofmdicalfeminism.  Boston: Beacon Press.
D’Orso, Michael. 1996. Like judgment day: The ruin and redemption of u town culled
Rosewood. New York: Berkley Publishing Co.
Firestone, Shulamith. 1970. The dialectic ofsex. New York: William Morrow.
Frank&q, Ruth. 1993. While  women, ruce tnauers:  Tk sociul construction ofwhiteness.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Frye, Marilyn. 1983. The politics  of rea2icy:  Essays in feminist tkory.  Trumansburg, NY:
Crossing Press.
-. 1992. WiUfuI  virgin: Essays in feminism. Freedom, CA: Crossing Press.
Gallagher, Charles. 1994. White reconstruction in the university. Socialist Review 94( 1
and 2): 165-88.
Gilroy,  Paul. 1993. The Muck Atlantic: Modernity and double consciousness. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Gooding-Williams, Robert. 1995. Comments on Anthony Appiah’s  In my father’s house.
Paper presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division
Meetings, Chicago, April.
Gordon, Lewis. 1995. Budfuith  anduntiblackrutism.  Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities
Press.
Gossett, Thomas E 1965. Race: The history ofan idea in America. New York: Schocken.
Harrington,  Michael L. 1996. Traditions  and changes: Tk University of Missi@@  in
principle and in practice. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hudson, Hosea.  1972. Black worker in the deep South: A personal record. New York:
International Publishers.
Ignatiev, Noel and John Garvey.  1996. Race  traitor. New York: Routledge.
Jordan, Winthrop. 1968. White  over black: American attitudes toward the Negro JSO-
18 J 2. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
Joseph, Gloria. 198 1. The incompatible menage h trois: Marxism, feminism, and racism.
In Women and reclolution,  ed. Lydia Sargent. Boston: South End Press.
Katz, Judith. 1978. White awareness: Handbook for anti-racism tiuining. Norman: Univer-
sity of Oklahoma Press.
Mills, Charles. 1997. The racial  contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ramos, Juanita. 1995. Latin American lesbians speak on black identity-Violeta Garro,
Minerva Rosa Perez, Digna, Magdalena C., Juanita. In Moving beyond boundaries,
Volume 2: Black women’s diusporus,  cd. Cwolc Royce Davies.  New York: New York
University Press.
Rich, Adrienne. 1979. Disloyal to civilization: Feminism, racism, gynephobia. In On
lies, secrets, and  silence. New York: W. W. Norton.
Simons, Margaret A. 1979. Racism and feminism: A schism in the sisterhood. Feminist
Studies S(Z)(Summer):  384-401.
Taylor, Paul. 1996. A new Negro: Pragmatism and black identity. Unpublished ms.
Wiegman, Robyn. 1995. American anatomies: Tkorieng  ruce and gender. Durham: Duke
University Press.
16
Locating Traitorous Identities:
Toward a View of Privilege-Cognizant
White Character
ALISON BAILEY
I address the problem of how to locate “traitorous” subjects, or those who belong
to dominant groups yet resist the usual  assumptions and practices of those groups. I
argue that Sandra Harding’s description of traitors us insiders, who “become
marghal” is misleading. Crafting a distinction between “privilege-cognizant” and
“gritilege-eoasioe” white scripts, I offer an akernutioe account of race traitors as
p-ivikge-cognizant  whites who refuse to animate expected whitely scripts, and who
are unftithful  to worldviews whites are expected to hold.
I had begun to feel pretty irregularly white. Klan folks had
a word for it: race traitor. Driving in and out of counties
with heavy Klan activity, I kept my eye on the rear-view
mirror, and any time a truck with a confederate flag passed
me, the hair on the back of my neck would rise. . . . I was
in daily, intimate exposure to the cruel, killing effects of
racism, which my Black friends spoke of in the same way
that they commented on the weather, an equally constant
factor in their lives. . . . I began to feel more uneasy
around other whites and more at ease around people of
color. . . . Maybe whiteness was more about consciousness
than color? That scared me, too, the possibility of being
caught between the worlds of race, white people kicking
me out, people of color not letting me in.
(Ma6  Segrest, Memoir of a Race Traitor, 1994,80)
!
Recent scholarship in multicultural, postcolonial, and global feminisms has
motivated a reanalysis of both feminist and mainstream philosophical texts,
-- 1-- - .-
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methodologies, concepts, and frameworks. One project springing from these
new approaches is a literature critical of white identities. At present, white
identity is constituted by and benefits from injustice. Transformative work
demands that whites explore how to rcarticulate our identities in ways that do
not depend on the subordination of people of color.
This paper addresses a simple but troublesome puzzle: the problem of how to
describe and understand the location of those who belong to dominant groups
yet resist the usual assumptions and orientations of those groups. The discus+
sion begins against the hickground of three archetypes of knowers: the disem-
bodied spectator, the outsider within, and the traitor. It sets out Sandra
Harding’s (1991) account of traitorous identities. Then, it takes issue with her
portrayal of traitors as insiders, who as a result of a shift in the way they
understand the world, “become marginal.” I argue that Harding’s description
is misleading and that it fails to capture her intended meaning. The paper
offers an alternative characterization of traitors that is less prone to misinter-
pretation. Crafting a distinction between “privilege-cognizant” and “privilege-
evasive” white scripts, I characterize race traitors as privilege-cognizant whites
who refuse to animate the scripts whites are expected to perform, and who are
unfaithful to worldviews whites are expected to hold. Finally, the paper
develops the notion of traitorous scripts and explains how animating them
helps to cultivate a traitorous character. Using Aristotle’s view of character
formation (1980) and Maria Lugones’s (1987) concept of “world” traveling, I
briefly sketch what it might mean to have a traitorous character.
DISEMBODIED SPECTATORS, OUTSIDERS WITHIN, AND TRAITORS
Feminist epistcmologists have long been attentive to the relationship
between knowing subjects’ locations and their understandings of the world.
Dissatisfaction with Enlightenment accounts of knowing subjects as faceless,
disembodied spectators who hover over the Cartesian landscape has led femi-
nist theorists to consider knowers as embodied subjects situated in politically
identifiable social locations or contexts. Attention to knowers as socially
situated creates a new angle of vision that allows us to consider the alternative
epistemic resources these situated subjects offer, Patricia Hill Collins (1990)
and Sandra Harding ( 1991), whose writings represent the variety of feminist
standpoint theory I have in mind here, prefer this approach because it is
attentive to the social and political structures, sytnbolic systems, and discourse
that grant privilege to some groups at the expense of others.
If the archetypal knower in Cartesian epistemic dramas is the disembodied
spectator, then the starring role in feminist standpoint theory is played by the
outsider within. Collins’s description of Black female domestics offers a clear
illustration of this second archetype (Collins 1986, ~14~15; also 1990,11-13).
As outsiders within, Black women working as domestics have an unclouded
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view of the contradictions between the actions and ideologies of white fami-
lies. This unique angle of vision is rooted in the contradictory location of the
domestic, who is at once a worker, “privy to the most intimate secrets of white
society,” and a Black woman exploited by and excluded from privileges granted
by white patriarchal rule. Her “Blackness makes her a perpetual outsider,” but
her work of caring for white women “allows her an insider’s view of some of
the contradictions between white women thinking that they are running their
lives ;lllcl the iICtUiI1 source of power  in white [XltriiltCllill  lU~ldWldS” (Collins
1990, 11-12).
Outsiders within are thought to have an advantageous epistemic viewpoint
that offers a more complete account of the world than insider or outsider
perspectives alone. Their contradictory location gives rise to what W. E. B.
DuBois refers to as a “double-consciousness,” a sense of being able to see
themselves through their own eyes and through the eyes of others (DuBois
1994, 2). Extending Collins’s analysis, Harding argues that women scientists,
African American women sociologists, or lesbian literary critics doing intel-
lectual work in the predominantly white, heterosexual male academy also
have “identities [that] appear to defy logic, for ‘who we are’ is in at least two
places at once: outside and within, margin and center” (Harding 1991, 275).
As strangers to the social order of the academy, they bring a unique combina-
tion of nearness and remoteness to their subject matter that helps to maximize
objectivity (Harding 1991, 124).
Because insiders have few incentives or opportunities to cultivate a bifur-
cated consciousness, their identities are understood as obstacles to producing
reliable accounts of the world. For example, class privilege makes it a
challenge for those with money to understand why moving out of poverty
is so difficult; the privilege afforded to white people by racism makes it hard
for whites to grasp its pervasiveness. Similarly, heterosexuals are rarely in a
position to analyze either heterosexual privilege or institutional and per-
sonal homophobia.’
For all of the social benefits afforded to insiders, some members of these
dominant groups resist the assumptions most of their fellow insiders take for
granted. Feminist standpoint theory has been less attentive to such subject
positions than to disembodied spectators and outsiders within. However, in the
final chapters of Whose Science? WItose Knowledge? (1991),  Harding makes a
compelling case for expanding the insights of standpoint theory to consider
how traitorous identities might serve as sites for liberatory knowledge. Reach-
ing deeper into the logic of standpoint theory she explains:
One can begin to detect other identities for knowers . . . stand-
ing in the shadows behind the ones [identities] on which
feminist and other liberator-y thought has focused, identities
that are struggling to emerge as respected and legitimate pro-
---- - -
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ducers of illuminating analysts. From the perspective of the
fiercely fought  s truggles to claim legit imacy for  the
marginalized identities, these identities appear to be monstrous:
male feminists; whites against racism . . . heterosexuals against
heterosexism; economically overadvantaged people against
class exploitation. (Harding 1991, 274)
Harding’s discovery suggests that insiders are not, by virtue of their social
location, immune to understanding the viewpoints and experiences of
marginalized groups. Anti-racist whites do criticize white privilege, and femi-
nist men do resist gender roles that reinforce women’s oppression. So, “People
who do not have marginalized identities can nevertheless learn from and learn
to use the knowledge generated from the perspective of outsiders within”
(Harding 1991,277). Those who do are said to have “traitorous identities” and
to occupy “traitorous social locations” (Harding 1991, 288-96).
Harding observes a significant epistemic difference between how insiders
who are “critically reflective” of their privilege, and insiders who are oblivious
to privilege, understand the world. Traitors do not experience the world in the
same way outsiders within experience it, but outsider-within political analyses
do inform their politics. Outsider-within standpoints provide tools for mem-
bers of dominant groups who may be unable to articulate or clarify the
occluded nature of their privilege and its relation to the oppression experi-
enced by outsiders. By learning about lives on the margins, members of
dominant groups come to discover the nature of oppression, the extent of their
privileges, and the relations between them. Making visible the nature of
privilege, enables members of dominant groups to generate liberatory knowl-
edge. Being white, male, wealthy, or heterosexual presents a challenge in
generating this knowledge, but is not an insurmountable obstacle.
Knowledge emerging from outsider-within locations, then, is valuable on
two counts. First, it calls attention to the experiences of marginalized groups
overlooked by earlier epistemological projects. Second, those who occupy the
center can learn from and learn to use the knowledge generated by the analyses
of outsiders within to understand their relationships with marginalized persons
from the standpoint of those persons’ lives (Collins 1986, s29;  Harding 199 1,
277). Harding describes insiders who adopt a critically reflective stance toward
privilege as “becoming marginal.” But I think this phrase leads to a misunder-
standing about what it means to be a traitor.
IN WHAT SENSE Do TRAITORS “BECOME MARGINAL”?
Describing subject identities in spatial terms initially offers a useful way of
seeing social structures and imagining the power relations between knowers.
In the margin-center cartography of feminist standpoint theory, traitors are
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described as people who “choose to become marginalized” (Harding 1991,289,
295). But this description is misleading for several reasons. The problem with
describing traitors as becoming marginal is more clearly understood if we keep
an historical example in mind.
In 1954, Anne and Carl Braden  purchased a home in a white section of
Louisville, Kentucky, for the purpose of deeding it to Charlotte and Andrew
Wade, a Black couple. Andrew Wade, a politically conscious member of the
Progressive Party and a World War 11 veteran, was furious that, even with his
service record, he could not purchase the home he wanted. The Bradens,  a
progressive couple who opposed segregation, agreed to buy the house and deed
it to the Wades. Their choice to break with the unspoken practice that
middle-class whites sell their homes only to other whites ostracized
(marginalized?) them in a way that other white families, who followed
expected house-selling practices, were not. After the transaction, Louisville’s
segregationists publicly denounced the Bradens as “traitors to [the] race.” They
argued that the Bradens  ought to have known better than to transgress the
unspoken rule that the races ought to live in separate communities (Braden
1958,82).  Within hours of the title transfer, the Bradens received threatening
phone calls and bomb threats. Months later they were charged with attempting
to overthrow the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. In what
sense then, could the Bradens be said to have chosen to become marginal? In
her memoir, Anne Braden  explains how, in the events that followed the house
purchase, “some of the protections that go with white skin in our society fell
from Carl and me. To an extent, at least, we were thrown into the world of
abuse where Negroes always live” (Braden 1958,7).
Braden’s  choice of words here suggests that the couple’s subject position
changed in some sense, but it also presents two problems. First, at a glance, to
describe the Bradens  as having become marginal makes it sound as if the
Bradens actually came to occupy outsider-within subject positions like those
occupied by the Wades. Deeding the house to the Wades did cause the Bradens
to lose privilege in their community, so it might be said that they became
marginal in the sense that they were ostracized from the white community
because of their actions. But being cast out does not amount to the same thing
as being situated as an outsider within. Given the wrath of segregationist
whites, the Bradens’ subject position might be said to have shifted in relation
to white citizens who saw them as race traitors. However, because they were
white in the eyes of those who did not know them, they did not completely
lose their privilege. In spite of their actions, the Bradens  continued to bear a
socially privileged racial identity; the Wades never had this privilege. Whites
who engage in traitorous challenges to segregation may undergo some shift in
their subject position in the sense that they may be ostracized from certain
communities, but they do not exchange their status as insiders for outsider-
within status.
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Harding anticipates this confusion and clarifies her position using the
example of privilege-cognizant heterosexuals.
Some people whose sexual identity was not “marginal” (in the
sense that they were heterosexual) have “become marginal”-
not by giving up their heterosexuality but by giving up the
spontaneous consciousness created by their heterosexual expe-
rience in a heterosexist world. These people do not think “as
lesbians,” for they are not lesbian. But they do think as hetcro-
sexual persons who have learned from lesbian analyses. (Har-
ding 1991,289)
than “becoming marginal” because they do not encourage this conflation of
the outsider within and the traitor. Decentering the center makes it clear that
traitors and outsiders within have a common political interest in challenging
white privilege, but that they do so from different social locations. Under-
standing traitors as destabilizers tidies up earlier misunderstandings, but I still
think standpoint theory’s margin-center cartography tends to restrict
Harding’s description of these subjects. If this language encourages mispercep-
tions about traitors, then we need to consider alternative descriptions of these
disloyal subjects.
Although the Bradens did not live as Black families in segregated Louisville
lived, they could understand, even if incompletely, what it might be like to live
in Louisville as the Wades lived in it. It is precisely this understanding that
Harding thinks the narratives and analyses generated by persons of color can
foster.
PRIVILEGE-COGNIZANT AND  PRIVILEGE-EVASIVE WHITE SCRIPTS
Thus, Harding’s intended meaning here is that it is possible for people like
the Bradens to learn about the world of segregated Louisville as the Wades
experienced it without actually coming to inhabit that world as do those who
are marginal. Describing the Bradens as “becoming marginal” best describes a
shift in their way of seeing, understanding, and moving through the world. Part
of the reason for this confusion is that the words “margin” and “center” are
usually used in standpoint theory to describe subject locations, and here they
are being used to describe an epistemic shift. “Becoming marginal” refers to
the shift from a perspective to a standpoint. The first is the product of an
unreflective account of one’s subject location; the second, as the word “anti-
racist” indicates, is a political position achieved through collective struggle
(Harding 1991, 123-27; Jaggar 1983,317).
Perhaps a clearer, more descriptive picture of traitors, one that focuses on
their decentering projects, will emerge if we think of traitors as privileged
subjects who animate privilege-cognizant white scripts. The distinction Har-
ding observes between insiders who are critical of their position and insid-
ers who are not is more accurately expressed as a distinction between
“privilege-cognizant” and “privilege-evasive” white scripts (Frankenberg
1993, 137-91). Understanding traitors along these lines requires spelling
out what is meant by a racial script and how privilege-cognizant and privi-
lege-evasive white scripts differ.
Like sexism, racism is a social-political system of domination that comes
with expected performances, attitudes, and behaviors, which reinforce and
reinscribe unjust hierarchies. Feminists have long paid attention to the ways
gender roles encourage habits and nurture systems that value men’s ideas,
activities, and achievements over those of women. The existence of sexism
and racism as systems requires everyone’s daily collaboration.
Harding’s intended meaning of “becoming marginal” should now be clearer. To understand the nature of this collaboration, it is helpful to think of the
However, even if we understand “becoming marginal” to refer to an epistemic attitudes and behaviors expected of one’s particular racial group as perfor-
shift, I would argue that this phrase does not really capture the meaning of the mances that follow historically preestablished scripts. Scripts differ with a
traitorous standpoint Harding finds so compelling. Describing traitors as subject’s location within systems of domination. What it means to be a man or
“becoming marginal” encourages a blurring or conflating of the location of the a woman is not exclusively defined by one’s physical characteristics. Similarly,
outsiders within and the location of traitors. The description makes it sound what it means to be Black, white, Comanche, Korean, or Latina is defined not
as if traitors have a foot in each world and are caught equally between them, only by a person’s physical appearance (so-called “racial” markers such as skin
and this picture does not foreground white privilege. If, for the moment, we color, hair, facial features, body shape), but also by that person’s performance-
retain the language of standpoint theory, it is more accurate to describe the by the script that individual animates. When the concept of racial scripts is
Bradens’ actions as destabilizing the center. Race traitors are subjects who applied locally, what it means to be a white woman in Louisville, or an African
occupy the center but whose way of seeing (at least by insider standards) is American man in Chicago includes a person’s gestures, language, attitudes,
off-center. That is, traitors destabilize their insider status by challenging and concept of personal space, gut reactions to certain phenomena, and body
resisting the usual assumptions held by most white people (such as the belief awareness. Attention to race as performative, or scripted, reveals the less
that white privilege is earned, inevitable, or natural). Descriptions of traitors visible, structural regulatory function of racial scripts that exclusive attention
as decentering, subverting, or destabilizing the center arguably work better to appearance overlooks.
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Marilyn Frye’s (1992) d iscussion  of “whitely” behavior and “whiteliness”
offers a conceptual distinction that is instrumental in understanding the
performative dimensions of race and the distinction between privilege-evasive
and privilege-cognizant scripts. Frye recognizes the need for a terminology that
captures the contingency between phenotype (racial appearance) and the
value of whiteness. Paralleling the distinction feminists make between male-
ness, something persons are born with by virtue of their biological sex, and
masculinity, something socially connected to maleness but largely the result of
social training, Frye argues for an analogous pair of terms in racial discourse
and coins “whitely” and “whiteliness” as the racial equivalents of maleness and
masculinity, respectively. As Frye explains: “Being white skinned (like being
male) is a matter of physical traits presumed to be physically determined: being
whitely (like being masculine) I conceive as a deeply ingrained way of being
in the world” (Frye 1992, 150-51). The connection between “acting white”
and “looking white” is contingent, so it is possible for persons who are not
classified as white to perform in whitely ways and for persons who are white
not to perform in whitely ways. Racial scripts are internalized at an early age
to the point where they are embedded almost to invisibility in our language,
bodily reactions, feelings, behaviors, and judgments. Whitely scripts are, no
doubt, mediated by a person’s economic class, ethnicity, sexuality, gender,
religion, and geographical location, but privilege is granted on the basis of
whitely performances nevertheless (Davion 1995, 135-39). A few examples
can highlight some facets of whitely, or privilege-evasive scripts.
Lillian Smith, a white woman growing up in Jim Crow Georgia, offers one
illustration of a whitely script. She was taught to “[act] out a special private
production of a little script that is written on the lives of most Southern
children before they know words” (1949, 21).
I do not remember how or when, but. . . . I knew that I was
better than a Negro, that all black folks have their place and
must be kept in it, that sex has its place and must be kept in it,
that a terrifying disaster would befall the South if ever I treated
a Negro as my social equal and as terrifying a disaster would
befall my family if ever I were to have a baby outside of
marriage. . . . I had learned that white southerners are hospita-
ble, courteous, tactful people who treat those of their own
group with consideration and who carefully segregate from all
the richness of life “for their own good and welfare” thirteen
million people whose skin is colored a little differently from my
own. (Smith 1949’18)
Smith describes this script as a “dance that cripples the human spirit.” It was
a dance she repeated until the movements “were made for the rest of [her] life
without thinking” (Smith 1949, 91). What I find remarkable about Smith’s
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“little script” is the clarity with which she connects racial segregation and the
control of white women’s sexuality.
Anne Braden  recounts a similar script growing up in Alabama and Missis-
sippi in the 1930s. Braden’s description is especially attentive to the spatial
dimensions of racial scripts.
Most of these things, it is true, were never said in words. They
were impressed on the mind of the white child of the South’s
privileged class. . . .
It was a chant of. . . we sit in the downstairs of the theater,
Negroes sit upstairs in the balcony-you drink from this foun-
tain, Negroes use that fountain-we eat in the dining room,
Negroes eat in the kitchen-colored town, our street-white
schools, colored schools-be careful of Negro men on the
streets-watch out-be careful-‘on’t  go near colored town
after dark-you sit on the front of the bus, they sit in the
back-your place, their place-your world, their world.
(Braden 1958’21)
Braden  also acknowledges an interesting linguistic facet of whitely scripts.
Sometimes the commandments became quite explicit. For
example, I could not have been more than four or five years old
when one day I happened to say something to my mother about
a “colored lady.” “You never call colored people ladies [her
mother replied]. . . . You say colored woman and white lady-
never a colored lady.” (Braden 1958, 21)
Attentiveness to maintaining the boundaries of one’s racial location, then, is.
a strong dimension of all racial scripts.
Racial scripts are not regulated only by attitudes and an awareness of
people’s appropriate place; scripts also have a strong corporeal element that
emerges in gestures and reactions to persons who we think of as being unlike
ourselves. We are all, on some level, attentive to the race of persons with whom
we interact, and this shapes our encounters. Even privilege-cognizant whites
who are consciously committed to combating racism may react with aversion
and avoidance toward people of color. African Americans receiving these
avoidance behaviors feel noticed-marked. In his essay “A Black Man Ponders
His Power to Alter Public Space,” Brent Staples (1986) offers the following
account of a white women who passes him on the street at night.
I often witness the “hunch posture,” from women after dark on
the warrenlike streets of Brooklyn, where I live. They seem to
set their faces on neutral and, with their purse straps strung
across their chests bandoleer style, they forge ahead as though
----- --._-__-  -
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bracing themselves against being tackled. I understand, of
course, that. . . . women are particularly vulnerable to street
violence, and young black males are drastically over-
represented among the perpetrators of violence. Yet these
truths are no solace against the kind of alienation that comes
of being ever the suspect, against being set apart, a fearsome
entity with whom pedestrians avoid making eye contact.
(Staples 1986, 54)
The majority of whitely scripts include being nervous around people of
color, avoiding eye contact with them, or adopting closed, uncomfortable
postures in their presence. The repeated animation of these scripts, however,
reinscribes a racial order in which white lives, culture, and experiences are
valued at the expense of the lives of persons of color, whose bodies are fearsome
to whites and are who are cast as deviant, dirty, criminal, ugly, or degenerate.
These accounts of privilege-evasive scripts provide a contrast to my account
of privilege-cognizant scripts; they also help to explain why privilege-cogni-
zant scripts count as traitorous. What all racial scripts have in common is that
in a white-centered culture, everyone is more or less expected to follow scripts
that sustain white privilege. The whitely scripts described by Smith, Staples,
and Braden  are privilege-evasive: they do not challenge whites to think about
privilege, and their reenactment reproduces white privilege. If scripts sustain-
ing white privilege are required by members of all racial groups, then members
of both privileged and oppressed groups can refuse to cooperate. What holds
racism in place, metaphorically speaking, is not only that African Americans
have sat in the back of the bus for so long, but also that whites have avoided
the task of critically examining and giving up their seats in front. By refusing
to examine privilege, whites uncritically resign themselves to whitely scripts-
to having their identities shaped in ways they may not have chosen (Harding
1991,294).
Recognizing that whites can use the analyses of outsiders within to forge
traitorous scripts means we can learn to think and act not out of the “sponta-
neous consciousness” of the socially scripted locations that history has written
for us, but out of the traitorous (privilege-cognizant) scripts we choose with the
assistance of critical social theories generated by emancipatory movements
(Harding 1991, 295). A key feature of privilege-cognizant standpoints is the
choice to develop a critically reflective consciousness. As one participant in
Ruth Frankenberg’s study of white women observes “coming from the white
privileged class . . . means you don’t have to look at anything else. You are
never forced to until you choose to, because your life is so unaffected by
anything like racism” (Frankenberg 1993, 161). Traitors choose to try to
understand the price at which privileges are gained; they are critical of the
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unearned privileges granted to them by white patriarchal cultures, and they
take responsibility for them.
Choosing to take responsibility for my interactions requires that I take
responsibility for my “racial social location, by learning how I am connected
to other whites and persons of color; by learning what the consequences of my
beliefs and behaviors as a European American woman will be” (Harding 1991,
283). An integral moment in understanding my relation to people differently
situated from mc comes in Icarning to see how I 11111 seen  by outsiders. It
requires a variation on DuBois’s double consciousness.
Unlike whites who unreflectively animate whitely scripts, the traitor’s task
is to find ways to develop alternative scripts capable of disrupting the constant
reinscription of whitely scripts. Privilege-cognizant whites actively examine
their “seats in front” and find ways to be disloyal to systems that assign these
seats. Some obvious examples include choosing to stop racist jokes, paying
attention to body language and conversation patterns, and cultivating an
awareness of how stereotypes shape perceptions of people of color. Telling, and
permitting others to tell, racist jokes reinscribes images that are harmful. The
traitor knows when it is appropriate to stop this reinscription. Similarly, the
white woman who clutches her bags or steers her children away from African
American youth, or the white man who acts uncomfortable or nervous in the
presence of people of color, sends signals to those around him that members of
these groups are to be feared. Whites who interrupt, ostracize, or dismiss the
contributions of students of color in the classroom reproduce their invisibility
by sending the message that these students’ contributions are unimportant. If
traitors can rearticulate white scripts in ways that do not reinscribe these
subordinating gestures, then we can begin to imagine ways of being, as Adri-
enne Rich (1979) says, “disloyal to civilization.”
The language of racial scripts presents an account of traitors that avoids the
misunderstandings generated by standpoint theory’s margin-center cartogra-
phy. It also offers a dynamic account of traitors that is consistent with the
epistemic framework of standpoint theory. This distinction between privilege-
cognizant and privilege-evasive scripts is another way of articulating the
distinction standpoint theorists make between a standpoint and a perspective.
Privilege-evasive white scripts might be said to have unreflective perspectives
on race. For example, most liberal discourse on racism illustrates a form of
linguistic privilege-evasiveness characteristic of the whitely scripts. Phrases
such as “I don’t see color, I just see people,” or “We all belong to the same
race-the human race” erase color, which also amounts to a failure to recog-
nize whiteness (Frankenberg 1993, 149). Privilege-cognizant scripts rely on
anti-racist standpoints because they come about through collective resistance
to naturalized patterns of behavior and social actions that reproduce white
privilege. Animating a privilege-cognizant script requires more than occasion-
ally interrupting racist jokes, listening to people of color, or selling Black
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families real estate in white neighborhoods. An occasional traitorous act does
not a traitor make. Truly animating a privilege-cognizant white script requires
that traitors cultivate a character from which traitorous practices will flow.
CULTIVATINGATRAITOROUSCHARACTER
When traitors refuse to act out of the spontaneous whitely consciousness
that history has bestowed on them, they shift more than just their way of seeing
and understanding the world. To be a race traitor is to have a particular kind
of character that predisposes a person to animate privilege-cognizant scripts.
The shift from privilege-evasive to privilege-cognizant white scripts, then, can
be understood as a shift in character. It is this change in character that causes
whites to move “offdcenter,”  to reposition themselves with regard to privilege.
This final section briefly explores what it might mean to cultivate a traitorous
character and demonstrates why developing a traitorous character must
include being a “world traveler.”
The idea that animating privilege-cognizant scripts helps to cultivate a
traitorous character, and that traitorous characters are more likely to animate
these scripts is, at root, Aristotelian: becoming traitorous is a process similar to
the acquisition of moral virtue (Aristotle 1980). For Aristotle, virtues arise
through habit, not nature. Virtue is a disposition to choose according to a rule;
namely, the rule by which a truly virtuous person possessed of moral insight
would choose. All things that come to us by nature we first acquire potentially;
it is only later that we exhibit the activity. We become virtuous by doing
virtuous deeds. Although states of character arise from activity, Aristotle
makes a distinction between two sorts of activities and their ends. There are
activities such as shipbuilding, in which the product of one’s activity (the ship)
is an end distinct from the process ofshipbuilding; and, there are activities such
as getting in shape where the product (a healthy and fit body) is part of the
activity of working out and not a distinct end. The activity of virtue resembles
the workout example. Just as a person does not become fit by doing a series of
situps and then declaring, “There, I am fit!” so a person does not become
virtuous by doing a series of good deeds and then declaring, “Finally, I am
virtuous!” Virtue and fitness arise in the process of continually working out or
doing good deeds. We become virtuous when we have the practical wisdom,
for example, to act courageously to the right degree, for the right reasons, and
under the right circumstances.
Developing a traitorous character requires lots of legwork. Learning about
the lives of those on the margins means understanding the material conditions
that give rise to outsider-within analyses; and to gain such an understanding,
traitors must be “world travelers.” In her now-classic essay, “Playfulness,
‘World’-Traveling, and Loving Perception” (1987),  Maria Lugones  offers an
account of identity in which subjects are shifting and multiplicitous. Recog-
nizing identities as plural takes place through a process she calls “world”
traveling.3  Lugones believes that women’s failure to love one another stems
from a failure to identify with women who inhabit worlds they do not share; it
is a failure to see oneself in other women who are different. Lugones’s work
addresses this failure, which she attributes to seeing others, who occupy worlds
outside the ones in which we feel comfortable, with “arrogant eyes.” When
white women perceive Asian women with “arrogant eyes,” or when African
American women view Jewish women with arrogant perception, they fail to
interact and identify with one another lovingly. Because arrogance blocks
coalition building, world traveling must be done with loving perception.
The notions of “world,” “world-traveling,” and “loving perception” help
Lugones to explain why she is perceived as serious in Anglo, or white, worlds
where she is not at ease, and as “playful” in Latina worlds where she is at home.
The failure of white women to love women of color is implicit in whitely scripts
in which Anglo women “ignore us, ostracize us, render us invisible, stereotype
us, leave us completely alone, interpret us as crazy. All of this wMe we are in
their midst” (Lugones  1987, 7).
When Harding describes standpoints as achievements, I think she means The privilege-evasive scripts animated by white women are easily explained
“achievement” in the sense in which having a virtuous character is an achieve- in the logic of world travel. The failure of whites to see race privilege is, in part,
ment (Harding 1991, 127). A hc ieving a traitorous standpoint, like cultivating a function of a failure to world travel. In the United States, people of color
virtue, is a process. When a person has the practical wisdom to know which world travel out of necessity, but white privilege ensures that most whites need
lines in whitely scripts to change, when to change them, and when to leave to world travel only voluntarily. When Anglo women refuse to travel to worlds
them alone, then they can be said to possess the practical wisdom necessary for where they are ill at ease, they are animating privilege-evasive scripts. Most
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a traitorous character.2  Having a traitorous character is not the same thing as
possessing a particular trait. Just as there is no recipe for attaining a virtuous
character, there is no one formula for becoming a race traitor. It is a mistake to
think that becoming traitorous is tantamount to completely overcoming rac-
ism. There will be times when our traitorous practical wisdom will be a bit off
and we will fall back into privilegeeevasive scripts, often without being aware
that we are doing so. An account of traitorous character recognizes this
instability. Developing a traitorous character requires a political strategy. It is
not enough, as Harding says, to repeat what African American thinkers say,
and never to take responsibility for my own analyses of the world that I, a
European American, can see through the lens of their insights. A “functioning
anti-racist-one who can pass the ‘competency test’ as an anti-racist-must be
an actively thinking anti-racist, not just a white robot programmed to repeat
what Blacks say” (Harding 1991, 290-91).
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whites are at ease in white worlds where we are fluent speakers, where we know
and can safely animate whitely scripts, where people of color are out of our line
of vision, and where our racial identity is not at risk. Mhen I restrict my
movement to worlds in which I am comfortable, privilege is difficult to see,
and whitely scripts are never challenged. Loving perception requires that
white women world travel as a way of becoming aware of the privilege-evasive
scripts we have learned.
World travel, then, is an indispensable strategy for cultivating a traitorous
character. Traitors must get out of those locations and texts in which they feel
at home. World travel forces us to put our privileged identities at risk by
traveling to worlds where we often feel ill at ease or off-center. Like virtuous-
ness, traitorousness requires developing new habits; and one crucial habit
might be to resist the temptation to retreat back to those worlds where we feel
at ease-whole. In the process of traveling, our identities fall apart, our
privilege-evasive scripts no longer work, and the luxury of retreating to a safe
space is temporarily removed. Travel makes privilege-evasive scripts visible
and we get a glimpse of how we are seen through the eyes of those whom we
have been taught to perceive arrogantly.
Mab Segrest’s story is a moving illustration of how world travel is integral to
coalition building across boundaries of race, gender, class, and sexual orienta-
tion. As a white lesbian doing civil rights work in North Carolina, Segrest
explains how “with Reverend Lee and Christina in my first months at States-
ville, I crossed and recrossed more racial boundaries than I had ever managed
in the eighteen years I had lived in my similar Alabama hometown. With
them, I had access to the Black community, and I saw white people through
their eyes” (Segrest 1994, 17). Learning to see ourselves as others see us is a
necessary starting point for learning to undo privilege-evasive scripts. Whites
like Segrest, who, with “loving perception,” travel to the worlds inhabited by
African American civil rights activists in the South, put their identities at risk
and, in so doing, realize the difficulties surrounding the process of unlearning
privilege-evasive scripts.
The approach I have outlined here is not a radical break from I-Iarding’s
original insight. What I have tried to do is to rearticulate her insights in a
language that avoids some of the confusion I think the margin-center cnrtog-
raphy of feminist standpoint theory encourages. I have also tried to explore
what it might be like to cultivate a traitorous character in a way that focuses
on traitorous performances, rather than on traitorous identities and locations.
The idea that traitorousness requires developing a traitorous character that
makes one more likely to animate a privilege-cognizant script is very much in
the spirit of Harding’s work. Although Harding’s descriptions of traitors as
“becoming marginal” through a process of “reinventing oneself as other” limits
her descriptions of traitors, I think what she is after is an active account of
traitorousness as more than just a political identity. Recall that “reinventing
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ourselves as other” refers to a shift in one’s way of seeing, and Lugones’s sense
of world travel certainly does this. Harding hints at this when she says
“intellectual and political activity are required in using another’s insights to
generate one’s own analyses” (Harding 1991, 290). Harding’s description of
traitorousness as political activity is closer to the performative notion I have
in mind, and 1 think it is one with which she would agree.
NOTES
This paper is the product of many conversations I had during a National Endowment
for the Humanities summer seminar on feminist epistemologies, June-July 1996,
Eugene, Oregon. 1 would like to thank Drue Barker, Lisa Heldke, Sarah Hoagland,
Amber Katherine, Shelly Park, and Nancy Tuana  for their thoughts on this topic during
our time together. I would also like to thank the editors of this volume for their
comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. As standpoint theory focuses on institutional systems, practices, and discourses
that unequally distribute power, the word privilege is used to refer to systematically
conferred advantages individuals enjoy by virtue of their membership in dominant
groups with access to resources and institutional power that are beyond the common
advantages of marginalized citizens (Bailey 1998).
2. Traitorous acts committed  just for the sake of traitorousness can be dangerous.
History and literature are filled with cases of well-meaning whites whose good inten-
tions put the lives, jobs, or achievements of friends and acquaintances of color in
jeopardy. See, e.g., the fictional case of Bigger Thomas in Richard Wright’s novel Native
Son (Wright 1940).
3. For those unfamiliar with Lugones’s work, “worlds” are neither utopias nor
constructions of whole societies. They may be small parts of a society (e.g., a barrio in
Chicago, Chinatown, a lesbian bar, a women’s studies class, or a farmworkers commu-
nity). The shift from having one attribute, say playfulness, in a world where one is at
ease, to having another attribute, say seriousness, in another world Lugones  calls
“travel” (Lugones  1987).
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Multiculturalism as a Cognitive Virtue
of Scientific Practice
ANN E. CUDD
I argue that science will be better, by its own criteria, ifitpursues multiculturalism,
by which I mean an ethnic- and gender-diwerse set of scientists. 1 argue that minority
and women scientists will be more likely to recognize false, prejudiced assumptions
about race and gentler that infect theories. And the kinds of changes that society will
undergo in pursuing multiculturalism will help reveal these faulty assumptions to
scientists of all races and genders.
Despite nearly two decades of pathbreaking feminist epistemological research
and writing and almost as many years of work on postcolonial and racial critiques
of science, the mainstream of philosophical literature has yet to absorb the lessons
of this work. I find this especially disappointing because of the inroads made by the
social epistemology movement, which now seems to have entered the mainstream
of philosophy of science and epistemology. Mainstream philosophers require not
merely good arguments but good reasons, stated in their terms, and using their
traditions. And being the mainstream, they are able to demand that. In this paper,
I shall argue for the lessons of the feminists and marginalized others in the language
of the mainstream, making the arguments from the traditions of analytic philoso-
phy. In particular, the lesson I intend to impart is that the dominance ofwhite  male
Westerners  in ‘science impoverishes science on its own terms, and that the
inclusion of excluded others will improve the content and the very objectivity of
science. In short, multiculturalism is a cognitive virtue (not to mention a require-
ment of justice) for science.
FOUNDATIONS DENIED
Foundationalism in the theory of knowledge is the idea that there are some
first principles that can be established to be beyond doubt, and that on them
